Pace Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 2 Spring 2014

Article 9

April 2014

Falling into the TRAP: The Ineffectiveness of ‘Undue Burden’
Analysis in Protecting Women’s Right to Choose
Laura Young
Pace University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Law and Gender
Commons

Recommended Citation
Laura Young, Falling into the TRAP: The Ineffectiveness of ‘Undue Burden’ Analysis in Protecting
Women’s Right to Choose, 34 Pace L. Rev. 947 (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Falling into the TRAP: The
ineffectiveness of ‘undue burden’
analysis in protecting women’s
right to choose
Laura Young*
I.

Introduction: Seeing the TRAP for what it is

In July 2012, a federal judge in Mississippi granted a
temporary restraining order against enforcement of new
abortion-related state legislation.1 The proposed legislation
required all physicians associated with abortion clinics in
Mississippi to maintain admitting and staff privileges at any
nearby hospital.2 If immediate enforcement of the legislation
had been permitted, the last remaining abortion clinic in
Mississippi would have been forced to close.3 The bill exposed
doctors and clinics without the requisite hospital privileges to
immediate criminal penalty, in the form of a $1,000-per-offense
misdemeanor fine.4 Continuing to operate throughout the
* J.D. Candidate (May, 2014), Pace University School of Law; B.A. (May,
2007), Mount Allison University. With gratitude for the support of my family
and friends.
1. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier (JWHO I), 878 F. Supp. 2d
714, 720 (S.D. Miss. 2012). In April 2013, the clinic moved for a preliminary
injunction to challenge the State’s revocation of the clinic’s license. Jackson
Women’s Health Org. v. Currier (JWHO II), 940 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D. Miss.
2013). The clinic had attempted (unsuccessfully) to comply with Mississippi
House Bill 1390 following District Judge Jordan’s 2012 decision in JWHO I.
JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 417-18 (finding that Jackson Women’s Health
Organization had met its burden, and granting preliminary injunction
against state licensure revocation).
2. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715; see also H.B. 1390, 2012 Leg., 127th
Sess. (Miss. 2012) (codified at MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-75-1 (2013)).
3. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
4. Id. at 718 (“[A]ny violation of any provision of this chapter . . . [shall
constitute a misdemeanor and] shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) for each such offense.” (quoting MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 41-75-26 (2013))).
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administrative process associated with the granting of hospital
admitting privileges would have been prohibitive, as the clinic
would have had to pay ongoing fines until it was in
compliance.5 The legislation thus placed Jackson Women’s
Health Organization (“JWHO”) in an untenable position: few if
any abortion clinics can continue to provide abortion services
with operating costs increased by $1,000 per practitioner per
day. Furthermore, the attendant criminal liability would have
acted as a severe disincentive to abortion practitioners
operating out of the clinic: although the State promised that it
would not enforce the criminal aspect of the law until a specific
period of time had lapsed in order to provide time for the
doctors to acquire privileges, there was no guarantee.6 This
lack of guarantee made doctors understandably nervous about
continuing to provide abortion services without obtaining
admitting privileges.7
Yet despite these concerns, the proposed regulation
appears to pass the ‘undue burden’ test promulgated in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,8
because it does not seem to have the purpose or effect of
restricting a woman’s reproductive autonomy in and of itself.9
Moreover, it is defensible because it is rationally related to the
recognized legitimate state concern for maternal health.10
However, the maternal health consequences of non-compliance
in this instance are minimal.11 Other abortion clinics in
5. Id. (“Each day of continuing violation shall be considered a separate
offense.” (quoting MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-75-26 (2013))).
6. Id. at 719-20.
7. Id. at 719-20; see also Amended Complaint, JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d
714 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (No. 3:12-CV-00436), 2012 WL 3234936.
8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. Id. at 877 (defining ‘unduly burdensome’ legislation as regulation with
the “purpose or effect” of putting a significant obstacle in a women’s path to
obtaining an abortion).
10. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (announcing that in
order to be deemed constitutional, laws restricting types of abortion available
to a woman need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest,,as
distinct from the compelling state interest in marital privacy previously
discussed in relation to contraceptive use under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 496-98 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
11. Campbell Robertson, Judge Maintains Injunction Against
Mississippi Law on Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/us/mississippi-abortion-law-injunction-is-
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Mississippi have been regulated out of existence in similar
ways,12 reflecting a United States-wide trend13 that American
pro-choice lobbyists have labeled ‘Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Providers’ (“TRAP”).14
TRAP regulations are identifiable in the following three
ways: (1) a TRAP regulation may be a new measure that
singles out abortion providers for medically unnecessary
standards (including building and personnel requirements); (2)
a TRAP regulation may needlessly address the licensing of the
clinic and/or charge a fee for licensure that exceeds the
reasonable amount charged to other less-politically-fraught
medical clinics; or, (3) a TRAP regulation may unnecessarily
regulate the place in which abortions may be performed (i.e.
require that abortions be provided only by hospitals, or
designate abortion clinics as ambulatory surgical centers,
thereby subjecting them to heightened standards not necessary
to ensure the safety of an abortion).15
Current United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
permits legislatures to take into account the health of the
mother when passing abortion-related legislation; however, it
also imposes an ‘undue burden’ ceiling on such legislation.16
extended.html (“[Legislators] say that such a rule . . . is a necessary
precaution in case complications occur during a procedure. . . . Jackson
Women’s Health Organization[] has responded that such complications are
extremely rare and says that in any case it already has a standing transfer
agreement with a local hospital . . . .”). Additionally, abortion clinics are
already regulated at the federal level to ensure maternal health. See, e.g.,
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578,
102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2012)); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936; Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
12. Abortion Laws: And Then There Was One, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21562215.
13. Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Bucks Tide with Bill to Ease Limits on
Abortion,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
16,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/nyregion/cuomo-bucks-tide-with-bill-tolift-abortion-limits.html.
14. Lisa M. Brown, The TRAP: Targeted Regulation of Abortion
Providers,
NAT’L
ABORTION
FED’N
1
(2007),
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_aborti
on/trap_laws.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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The challenge presented by TRAP regulations is that, when
each regulation is considered individually, they will not
constitute ‘undue burdens’ directly restricting a woman’s
ability to obtain an abortion. Considered in isolation from one
another, these regulations are even readily defensible, as they
are ostensibly promulgated to protect maternal health, which is
a legitimate state interest.17 According to Supreme Court
jurisprudence, these regulations are therefore constitutionally
sound.
This situation raises a significant question: is ‘undue
burden’ analysis sufficient to protect women’s reproductive
autonomy (right to choose)? Examining this question through
the prism of the Jackson Women’s Health Organization v.
Currier injunction decisions,18 I conclude that the capacity of
the ‘undue burden’ analysis to protect women’s right to choose
is more limited than previously thought. This conclusion stems
from three distinct loopholes in Supreme Court abortion
jurisprudence. First, ‘undue burden’ analysis focuses on
individual regulations, which might each be constitutionally
valid when considered in isolation, but which in aggregate
create an abortion regime that unduly burdens a woman’s
access to abortion and thereby impinges on her right to
reproductive autonomy. Second, ‘undue burden’ analysis
focuses on protecting the demand side of the abortion business
(i.e. maintaining access from the perspective of the woman
seeking an abortion) without devoting equal attention to
protecting the supply side of the abortion economy (i.e. the
ability of abortion providers to stay in business). This demandside emphasis on a woman’s ability to access abortion
dominates Supreme Court jurisprudence and limits the ‘undue
burden’ analysis on which women’s reproductive autonomy
relies.19 In response, opportunistic state legislatures have
shifted from imposing burdens directly on a woman seeking an
17. Id. at 877-78.
18. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715 (S.D. Miss. 2012); JWHO II, 940
F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013). These decisions, which relate to the
granting of an injunction rather than to the constitutionality of the
Mississippi law itself, are tangentially related as examples of TRAP and the
challenges courts confront when dealing with such legislation.
19. See Theodore Joyce, The Supply-Side Economics of Abortion, 365
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1466 (2011).
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abortion to imposing burdens on the clinics and individuals
providing abortions—the supply-side of the abortion economy.20
Although the effect is the same in that women’s right to choose
is unduly burdened, there is little within current ‘undue
burden’ jurisprudence to limit these supply-side regulations.21
Finally, the development of new medical technologies is leading
to regulations that do not themselves constitute ‘undue
burdens’ but that nevertheless put pressure on women to make
pro-life choices.22 New technology is also changing the meaning
of existing law. For example, technological advancements are
making it possible for fetuses to survive outside the womb at
younger and younger ages, shifting viability from the Wadeenvisioned twenty-eight week benchmark to twenty weeks or
less.23
20. Joyce, supra note 19, has identified an emerging division between
treatment of the demand side and the supply side of the abortion regulatory
regime (“[A]bortion opponents have turned to supply-side restrictions,
focusing on providers of abortion services.”).
21. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 598-602
(6th Cir. 2006) (determining whether a permanent injunction should be
vacated in a case where a clinic sought a waiver of a transfer agreement).
22. E.g., Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court and The
Language of Abortion Stigma, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 295 (2013); John
A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability,
and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327 (2011) (discussing
mandated sonograms and studies of fetal capacity for pain that suggest an
earlier threshold than previously thought).
23. Robertson, supra note 22, at 331. However, developments in
technology have also led to earlier and earlier detection of pregnancy, and
thus to earlier and earlier abortion procedures. It is also leading to calls for a
20-week abortion ban in some states. See Abortion: The 20-Week Limit,
ECONOMIST,
Mar.
8,
2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/unitedstates/21598684-new-curbs-abortion-are-spreading-20-week-limit. The 20week ban is supported by proponents who assert that there is not much
difference between ability to survive outside the fetus at 20 weeks as
compared to 24 weeks. Quaere whether pro-life arguments will subsequently
focus on how little difference there is between 18 weeks and 20. The other
problem with this, as highlighted by THE ECONOMIST, is that there are
situations in which the fetus’s fatal or otherwise severe disabilities may not
be revealed to the parents—through amniocentesis or otherwise—until after
the 20-week benchmark that pro-life advocates support. The morality of
determining whether to ‘keep’ a child on the basis of his or her ability level is
beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is worth noting here that moving
the choice-deadline up does raise other significant questions regarding the
availability of abortion where fetal health or even survival are determined
after the proposed 20-week deadline. This calls into even deeper question the
Casey Court’s rationale that “[t]he viability line . . . has . . . an element of
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The conclusion that ‘undue burden’ analysis is inadequate
to protect women’s right to choose requires that alternate
solutions to the TRAP problem be proposed. Although Congress
has used its Commerce Clause powers to protect access to
abortion from pro-life protestors,24 it is increasingly unlikely
that Congress will act further in such a politically-fraught area
of law.25 If we are to have protection for abortion clinics and the
women who require their services, it will have to evolve
through judicial decision-making.26 The Supreme Court has
hinted that the right to choose might be protected by a ‘purpose
and effect’ analysis,27 which echoes Supreme Court
jurisprudence in the realm of racial discrimination.28 However,
this solution appears to be equally limited. It seems that
looking to other areas of law may be required to explore
fairness. In some broad sense, it might be said that a woman who fails to act
before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the
developing child.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870
(1992). The Court notes that “[w]e have seen how . . . advances in neonatal
care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier.” Id. at 860. Yet,
despite this recognition, the Court maintained that viability was the point at
which the state’s interests become compelling. Id. at 870; see also Carole
Joffe, Roe v. Wade at 30: What are the Prospects for Abortion Provision? 35
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 29 (2003), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3502903.html.
Additionally,
a
decision from the Ninth Circuit held that a 20-week ban on abortion violated
the Constitution. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013). Judge
Kleinfield reluctant concurrence in Isaacson is worth noting both for its
recognition that the viability benchmark is an “odd rule” and for its
interesting analogy to death penalty anesthetization as a possible solution to
the fetal pain alleged in post-20 week abortions. Id. at 1231-34 (Kleinfield, J.
concurring).
24. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18
U.S.C. § 248 (2012).
25. Particularly given Congress’s current difficulties in coming to any
consensus on any topic. But see Peter Baker, In Speech to Planned
Parenthood, Obama Criticizes New Abortion Laws, THE CAUCUS (Apr. 26,
2013, 1:27 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/in-speech-toplanned-parenthood-obama-criticizes-new-abortion-laws/?src=rechp.
26. The Court appears reluctant to re-open the abortion debate. See In re
Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla.
2012), cert. denied sub nom. Personhood Oklahoma v. Barber, 133 S. Ct. 528
(2012) (denying certiorari in a case seeking to change the definition of
personhood).
27. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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solutions to this problem.
This Comment will first examine existing Supreme Court
abortion and reproductive autonomy jurisprudence before
seguing into an exploration of the limits of the ‘undue burden’
analysis through the Jackson Women’s Health Organization v.
Currier temporary and preliminary injunction decisions. The
final section of this Comment explores potential solutions from
other areas of constitutional law, and proposes that some
techniques for limiting the reach of state regulatory power
might be imported from environmental law,29 which frequently
must deal with interactions amongst complex regulatory
regimes.
II. Setting the TRAP: Evolving Supreme Court abortion
jurisprudence of ‘undue burden’
Prior to the 1973 landmark Supreme Court abortion case
Roe v. Wade,30 states were free to regulate abortion providers
however they saw fit—including banning the procedure
completely.31 Texas law criminalized abortions unless they
were performed to save the life of a pregnant woman.32 Roe v.
Wade arose when Jane Roe, pregnant and unmarried, sought a
safe abortion in Texas.33 As a result of her inability to find a
safe and legal abortion provider, Jane Roe brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas law, “on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated.”34 She
challenged the law as void for vagueness, and as a violation of
29. Although initially this may seem to be a stretch, there are
similarities in the challenges confronting both areas of law. At the moment,
much of environmental law is generally cast as in terms of an ethical
dilemma. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(2004). This is also true of the abortion debate; the possibilities for
opportunism in state action are also paralleled in environmental law. See
infra, Part V.B.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Abortion Laws: And Then There Was One, supra note 12.
32. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117-18.
33. Id. at 120. Legalized abortions are generally considered safer, since
legalization comes with regulatory requirements around cleanliness and
standards of care. See Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe
Abortion Law In Action, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 367 (1994).
34. Wade, 410 U.S. at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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her right to privacy.35 In a much-anticipated decision, the
35. Jane Roe argued that the laws were void for vagueness and that they
impinged on her right of personal privacy, specifically alleging violations of
her First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 120.
The question of standing in the context of this case and similar cases is an
interesting side-note:
Here, although Roe’s challenge was joined at the District Court level by an
intervenor (Dr. Halford, who provided illegal abortions to Texasn women in
need), and by a childless, non-pregnant couple (the Does, who asserted that
the statute criminalizing abortion constituted a potential threat to Mrs. Roe’s
health— – that she had received medical advice urging her not to become
pregnant, to stop taking birth control, and to terminate any pregnancy that
might arise), the District Court found that only Roe, members of her class,
and Halford had standing. Id. at 120-22, 125-29.
In contrast, the Supreme Court determined on appeal that the Does did not
have standing because their alleged injury was speculative. Id. at 129. It
found that Halford also did not have standing as an intervenor, and for a
similar reason: he made no allegations of any “substantial and immediate
threat,” and no claim of “harassment or bad-faith prosecution” that would
enable the Court to find Article III standing, as were required. Id. at 126. Dr.
Halford had challenged the constitutionality of the Texas law solely as a
doctor who had previously been arrested for violating Texas abortion laws.
Id. at 125-26; see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-67 (1986)
(physician did not have standing because he did not allege a specific injury;
he could not claim standing existed as general defender of unborn, nor as
father, nor as physician.) Standing does exist where “[a] physician . . .
challenge[s] an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal
prosecution.” Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65. A physician has standing when he
asserts the constitutional rights of others who cannot assert their rights
themselves, provided that he “demonstrate[] that abortion funding
regulations have a direct financial impact on his practice.” Id. at 65-66. Roe’s
standing was also questionable, because the duration of pregnancy is brief
compared to the appellate process, and yet Article III requires that “an actual
controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not
simply at the date the action is initiated.” Wade, 410 U.S. at 125 (collecting
cases). Nonetheless, recognizing that the procedural rule is impractical in the
context of a pregnant woman, the Court found that Roe had standing: her
pregnancy (and pregnancies of women in her class), as well as the injury
arising out of the Texas law criminalizing abortions was “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” Id. (collecting cases). The Court thus brought
constitutional challenges brought by pregnant women into an historical
exception to the Article III standing requirement. Id. at 125 (citing S. Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). Moreover, Roe had standing
even though she had not claimed pregnancy at the time she filed suit and had
terminated her pregnancy by the time her appeal came before the Supreme
Court. Id. at 124. Nor does the Supreme Court’s recent decision,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, shed any light on this particular contradiction. 133 S.
Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (dismissing Petitioners for lack of standing because
they had not “suffered a concrete and particularized injury.”). The
Hollingsworth petitioners, who were the official proponents of a ballot
initiative to amend California’s constitution to redefine marriage as a union
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Supreme Court announced an extension of women’s right of
privacy36 to encompass their reproductive decisions to carry (or
not carry) fetuses to term.37 However, the Court also
determined that there is a countervailing state interest in
protecting both maternal health and fetal health, thus creating
a sliding scale of constitutionally valid state regulation (and
permissible state invasion into women’s privacy rights) at each
stage of a woman’s pregnancy.38
Perhaps in the interests of simplifying things by using
already-established medical benchmarks, the Wade Court
created a trimester-based framework for assessing the
between opposite-sex couples, had appealed the lower court’s decision
although the State of California did not. Id. at 2659-60.
36. The Supreme Court first recognized a right of privacy with respect to
reproductive decision-making in its plurality decision, Griswold v.
Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). In that decision, Justice Goldberg
(joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan) appeared to consider
that this right could be abridged by the state only on a demonstration of a
compelling state interest in so doing. Id. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Petitioners in that case challenged a Connecticut birth control law that
prohibited the provision of birth control to married (and unmarried) couples.
Id. at 480 (opinion of the Court). This decision was based on an inferred right
of privacy, originating in the Bill of Rights: “specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.” Id. at 484. Privacy, the Court maintained,
was just such a right. Id. at 485. However, the Court also recognized that
there had, to that point, been numerous controversies over the recognition of
privacy as a fundamental right. Id. at 485 (collecting cases). This raises a
question about the firmness of the footing on which abortion law has been
built. The language used by the Court in its affirmation of privacy as a
constitutionally-protected right—“penumbras, formed by emanations”—
creates only the most tenuous link to the Constitution. Id. at 484. Is
reproductive autonomy threatened by the erosion of personal privacy in other
areas of law, for example, the erosion of personal privacy in response to
perceived terrorist threats? See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138 (2013). Alternately, current events may require the Court to re-examine
this link and perhaps forge a stronger protection for privacy generally. See,
e.g., Jill Lepore, The Prism: Privacy in an Age of Publicity, NEW YORKER, June
24,
2013,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/06/24/130624fa_fact_lepore.
Whether that stronger link will be one that is generally applicable, thereby
protecting abortion choices, or contextual, will naturally be a question the
Court will eventually have to confront should it review and re-define privacy
rights.
37. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-56.
38. Id. at 154 (“The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to
be absolute.”); see also supra note 37.
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constitutionality of abortion-related state regulation.39
According to Wade, the end of the first trimester was the
‘compelling point’ at which the State might regulate abortion in
a manner “reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and
protection of maternal health.”40 The Court identified a second
‘compelling point’ at viability: “the State . . . may go so far as to
proscribe abortion [after viability], except when it is necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother.”41 In its decision,
the Court focused on Jane Roe’s right of privacy, and on Jane
Roe’s ability to access abortion,42 emphasizing the demand side
of the abortion economy in this and subsequent decisions.
On the supply side, the Wade Court provided guidance to
states seeking to regulate abortion providers by listing types of
legislation that it considered permissible under its holding.
Thus, the following types of regulation are, under Wade,
constitutional actions that a state may take with respect to the
abortion economy:
[R]equirements as to the qualifications of the
person who is to perform the abortion; as to the
licensure of that person; as to the facility in
which the procedure is to be performed, that is,
whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic
or some other place of less-than-hospital status;
as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.43
Within reason, these criteria are calculated to protect
maternal health. Exploitation of the loopholes this language
provides, however, has led to the TRAP regulations seen across
the United States today.
In 1992, in the face of significant pressure from the United
States,44 the Court broadened its definition of permissible
39. Id. at 164-66.
40. Id. at 163.
41. Id. at 163-64.
42. See generally id.
43. Id. at 163.
44. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)
(“Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done
in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe.”).
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supply-side regulations while re-affirming its demand-side
commitment to women’s reproductive autonomy in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.45 In Casey,
the Court introduced the term ‘undue burden’ and clarified its
holding in Wade by eliminating the trimester framework in
favor of a viability benchmark.46 In so doing, the Court
explicitly stated that “the trimester framework . . . undervalues
the State’s interest in potential life.”47 The decision thus shifted
the balance away from protecting a pregnant woman’s right of
privacy and toward a state’s ability to impinge on that right.
The challenge in Casey centered on a series of consentrelated requirements within Pennsylvania law.48 These
provisions included a requirement that women give ‘informed
consent’ prior to abortion procedures.49 ‘Informed consent’
meant notifying women of the developmental progress of the
fetus immediately prior to performing the abortion, informing
them about the potential for paternal liability, and offering
other state-approved alternatives to abortion (such as adoption,
etc.).50 Minors could have abortions only with the consent of a
parent, although judicial exemptions were to be provided in
exceptional circumstances.51 Married women had to confirm
that they were seeking the procedure with the consent of their
husbands.52
The Court determined that these provisions—with the sole
exception of the marital consent provision—did not inflict an
‘undue burden’ on women’s reproductive autonomy.53 The
Court went on to define unduly burdensome regulation as
“state regulation ha[ving] the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an

45. See generally id.
46. Id. at 873 (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not
consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.”) (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 873.
48. Id. at 844; see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
50. Id. at 844, 881.
51. Id. at 844.
52. Id.
53. See generally id. at 879-901 (discussing each of the challenged
provisions).
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abortion of a nonviable fetus.”54 Note that the Court again
emphasizes the woman’s access to abortion—the demand side
of the economy—rather than the supply side, i.e. a clinic’s
ability to provide an abortion.
The Court also used the Casey decision as an opportunity
to eliminate the Wade trimester framework, focusing instead
on viability55 as the critical point at which states’ interests
might become burdensome on a woman while remaining
constitutionally valid: “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests
are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or
the imposition of a substantial obstacle to women’s effective
right to elect the procedure.”56 The Court upheld the Wade
determination that states could proscribe abortion after
viability, but required that such laws contain maternal-health
exemptions.57 Additionally, the Court confirmed that the state
has an interest in both maternal health and the life of the
unborn fetus from conception.58 These statements seemed
reasonable; however, the Court went on to discuss statelegislated regulations:
Numerous forms of state regulation might have
the incidental effect of increasing the cost or
decreasing the availability of medical care,
whether for abortion or any other medical
procedure. The fact that a law which [sic] serves
a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the
right itself, has the incidental effect of making it
more difficult or more expensive to procure an
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only
where state regulation imposes an undue burden
on a woman’s ability to make this decision does
the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.59
54. Id. at 837.
55. Viability is the point at which the fetus can survive outside of the
womb. Id. at 870.
56. Id. at 846.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 874 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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This language, particularly the italicized language,
signaled a shift away from an objective standard and toward a
legislative-purpose-based or intent-based subjective standard
that renders the infliction of ‘undue burden’ more difficult to
prove. The Court additionally determined that
Regulations which [sic] do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State, or the
parent or guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle
to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.
Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a
state measure designed to persuade her to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if
reasonably related to that goal.60
Taken together, these sections of the Casey decision
condone state legislation that severely constricts women’s
access to abortions, either physically (through TRAP
regulations) or emotionally (through mandated sonograms and
other ‘informed consent’ devices that might create doubt,
shame, or guilt in an otherwise resolved woman seeking the
procedure),61 so long as the creation of an ‘undue burden’ is not
an explicit purpose of the legislation and so long as there is no
evident, unduly burdensome effect.
Following the Casey decision, a series of cases out of
Nebraska forced the Court to refine its definition of ‘undue
burden.’ In these decisions, the Court further retrenched the
power of its Wade holding. In 2000, the Court was confronted
with a Nebraska law that banned two common types of late60. Id. at 877-78 (internal citation omitted).
61. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 295 (“Laws mandating invasive
ultrasounds, biased counseling sessions, and onerous waiting periods, along
with fetal “‘‘personhood”’’ and fetal pain laws, are intended to shame and
punish women who seek abortions.”). Abortions are already “something most
women would rather forget,” according to Dr. Willie Parker, who performs
abortions at the Jackson Women’s Health Organization Abortion Clinic.
Alissa Quart, Will Mississippi Close Its Last Abortion Clinic?, ATLANTIC (Jan.
22,
2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/willmississippi-close-its-last-abortion-clinic/267352/.
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pregnancy abortions, dilation and evacuation62 (“D & E”) and
dilation and extraction63 (“D&X”).64 The statute severely
restricted second-trimester abortion options for all women,
including those whose health and safety were threatened by
their later-term pregnancies; worse, it had no maternal health
exemption.65 The Court found the statute unduly burdensome
and void for vagueness.66
In 2003, a group of physicians who interpreted this
decision as requiring a maternal health exception in all
abortion-proscribing legislation challenged Nebraska’s PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act (“Nebraska Act”) on the grounds that it
did not contain such an exception.67 The Supreme Court
reviewed the Nebraska Act, along with a similar challenge out
of the Ninth Circuit, in its Gonzales v. Carhart decision.68
Despite the Act’s failure to include a maternal health
exception, the Supreme Court upheld that legislation as a
constitutional expression of state concern over maternal health.
In making this determination, the Court applied what it
considered the Casey balancing test—assessing the permissible
expression of a state’s “profound respect for the life of the
unborn” on the one hand, and the impermissible ‘undue
burden’ that a state’s exercise of regulatory authority might
impose on a woman’s right to choose on the other hand.69
62. “D[ilation] & E[vacuation] involves (1) dilation of the cervix; (2)
removal of at least some fetal tissue using nonvacuum instruments; and (3)
(after the 15th week) the potential need for instrumental disarticulation or
dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facilitate
evacuation from the uterus.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925 (2000).
63. “The breech extraction version of the intact D & E is also known
commonly as ‘‘dilation and extraction,’ or D & X.’ In the late second trimester,
vertex, breech, and transverse/compound (sideways) presentations occur in
roughly similar proportions.” Id. at 927 (citing Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 1099, 1108, 1112 (D. Neb. 1998); Maureen Paul et al., A CLINICIANS
GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 135 (1999)).
64. See also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 135 (2007) (explaining
that D&E, of which D&X is a sub-category, is the most common secondtrimester abortion technique).
65. See generally Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920-31 (discussing the challenged
provisions).
66. Id. at 937-38.
67. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 132-33.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 146 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
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Because the Nebraska Act only proscribed one type of latepregnancy abortion procedure, and did so with great specificity,
the Court opined that it was neither void for vagueness nor did
it unduly burden a woman’s reproductive autonomy.70
The Court also used its Gonzales decision to explain that
pre-viability states may regulate abortion so long as the
regulations are rationally related to the state interest in
maternal health, and provided that the regulation does not
impose an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right to choose.71 Since
rational basis review is the least stringent standard of
constitutional review, this decision grants states significant
latitude in pre-viability regulation of abortion procedures: any
regulation related to maternal health—no matter how remote
the relationship may be—is likely to be upheld under this
standard. This language represented a substantial departure
from the ‘narrow tailoring’ to meet a ‘compelling state interest’
language of Griswold.72 The Court’s indication that regulations
will henceforth be subject only to rational basis and undue
burden review has led to a proliferation of state regulations
that target abortion providers, shifting legislative undue
burdens onto the supply-side of the abortion economy.
Furthermore, the Court’s definition limits ‘undue burden’
analysis to individual regulations. The Court repeatedly used
the phrase “a state regulation”73 when describing what
833, 877-78 (1992)).
70. Id. at 146-47.
71. Id. at 158. (“Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not
impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power . . . in
furtherance of its legitimate interest . . . to promote respect for life, including
the life of the unborn.” See also id., 186-87 (Ginsburg, J dissenting). Rational
basis review permits significant over- or under-inclusiveness in the tailoring
of a given law. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)
(upholding a law limiting New York City advertisers to using only their own
trucks for promotional purposes in the interest of preventing driver
distraction. The law was substantially under-inclusive but upheld under
rational basis review nonetheless); cf. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding a law prohibiting Methadone users and those in
rehab from being hired by the Metro Transit Authority when only users were
considered to pose a substantial danger to public health. The law was
substantially over-inclusive but upheld under rational basis review
nonetheless).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-498 (1965).
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added); see also Okpalobi v. Foster,
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constitutes an unduly burdensome law—a grammatical
subtlety seized upon by opportunistic state law-makers, who
have since used individually constitutional regulations to
develop unconstitutional abortion regimes. These regulations
are individually constitutional because they masquerade as
being related to the protection of maternal health and because
individually they do not appear to pose a threat to women’s
ability to access abortion. The aggregate effect of these supplyside regulations, however, is to drive clinics out of business,
resulting in significant demand-side barriers to abortion.74

190 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 244 F.3d
405 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A measure that has the effect of forcing all or a
substantial portion of a state’s abortion providers to stop offering such
procedures creates a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to have a previability abortion, thus constituting an undue burden under Casey.” (citing
Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1465 (8th Cir.
1995))) (emphasis added).
74. These significant barriers to abortion predominantly affect
economically marginalized women, for whom abortion may already be costly
(up to $450, and largely uncovered by Medicaid; private coverage is also often
limited), and who cannot travel out-of-state as readily for a variety of
reasons, or who lack the resources to understand that such an option is
available. One survey has found that 38 percent of all reproductive-age
women live in counties without abortion clinics. Dana Liebelson & Molly
Redden, The Abortion Rate Hits a 30-Year Low, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 3, 2014,
4:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/abortion-rate-recorddecline-map. Such limited access is exacerbated by many states’ mandatory
waiting period (up to 72 hours between the initial abortion ‘counseling’
session and the procedure itself). See Quart, supra note 61; see also Barry
Yeoman, The Quiet War on Abortion, BARRYYEOMAN.COM (Sept. 1, 2001),
http://barryyeoman.com/2001/09/the-quiet-war-on-abortion/
(“But
many
women in outlying areas can’t afford the extra travel or hotel costs—not to
mention lost wages and childcare expenses—involved in a two-day trip to
obtain an abortion.”). Recently, news sources have trumpeted a decline of
nearly 13 percent in abortions in the period from 2008-2011—a return to preWade numbers. Abortion: The 20-Week Limit, supra note 23. In that same
period, however, abortion providers have decreased by 4 percent as
determined by a study released by the Guttmacher Institute. Liebelson &
Redden, supra note 74. The study also shows that, “[a]bortion clinics . . .
account for only 19 percent of the facilities that offer abortions, but provide
63 percent of abortions.” Id. Thus, an apparently negligible 4 percent decline
in clinic numbers represents a not-negligible decline in actual appointments
available, and may consequently have a substantial effect on women’s ability
(let alone right) to choose. There is a significant paucity of cases discussing
whether out-of-state travel constitutes an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right
to choose pre-viability. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595,
603 (6th Cir. 2006).
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III. TRAPpped: Constitutionally-valid State regulations of
abortion providers
Every state except Oregon currently imposes some sort of
restriction on access to abortion.75 A large number of these
states restrict access by imposing needless regulations on or by
over-regulating the demand-side of the abortion economy
(clinics and providers).76 For example, in August 2012, the
Fifth Circuit allowed Louisiana to revoke abortion licenses
immediately following discovery of any regulatory violation,
dismissing a challenge to these regulations for lack of ripeness
because the plaintiff-clinic and associated doctors had not yet
been subjected to any revocation of license for minor regulatory
infractions.77 Previously, in March of 2001, the Fifth Circuit
determined that a Louisiana statute permitting private action
in tort for emotional distress could be brought against abortion
providers.78 Abortion providers challenged the statute, alleging
injury arising out of the chilling effect such legislation would
have on them.79 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the challenge for
lack of standing, holding that the plaintiffs failed to carry their
burden of proving actual injury.80 Louisiana may be the
‘incubator’81 for TRAP regulation, but it is far from alone in
promulgating such discriminatory legislation.
According to Remapping Debate,82 Oklahoma imposes the
75. Sarah Kliff, All States Except Oregon Now Limit Abortion Access,
WONKBLOG,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2013,
10:26
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog; see also Mike Aberti, Dozens
of New State Limits on Abortion Added in 2012, REMAPPING DEBATE (Jan. 30,
2013),
http://www.remappingdebate.org/map-data-tool/dozens-new-statelimits-abortions-added-2012.
76. See Aberti, supra note 75.
77. Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 714-16 (5th Cir.
2012).
78. Opkalbi, 244 F.3d at 409-10.
79. Id. at 410 (“[T]he Act will force physicians in Louisiana to cease
providing abortion services to women because of the potential exposure to
civil damage claims authorized by the Act. . . . [And] if they are forced to
discontinue providing their services, the State may have achieved in practical
terms what it could not constitutionally do otherwise—eliminate abortions in
Louisiana.”).
80. Id. at 425-26.
81. Yeoman, supra note 74.
82. Sponsored by the Anti-Discrimination Center, Remapping Debate
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largest number of abortion restrictions of any state.83 Most
recently, Oklahoma added new questions to an abortion
questionnaire women must complete when they seek an
abortion.84 Republican Doug Cox, a doctor, criticized the
addition of these new questions as “an attempt to overburden
and intimidate abortion providers,” whose administrative costs
will rise as these new questions are incorporated into their
practice.85
In 2011, Kansas promulgated new regulations for abortion
clinics that stipulate, among other things, room temperature
and dimensions.86 These discriminatory regulations have not
been imposed on hospitals in the state, yet must be met by
abortion clinics if they wish to retain their licenses.87 The
legislation has been challenged in court: the timeline for
conformity is short, and the clinic is unlikely to meet its
deadline.88
Meanwhile, Virginia’s Health Commissioner resigned in
October 2012, protesting the enactment of a law that will force
existing abortion clinics in that state to comply with the same

operates out of New York City and “is committed to covering the full
spectrum of domestic public policy issues.” About Remapping Debate,
REMAPPING DEBATE.COM, http://www.remappingdebate.org/about/ (last visited
April 3, 2014).
83. Aberti, supra note 75.
84. These questions make the questionnaire longer and more invasive.
See H.B. 2015, 54 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2013) (codified at OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738k (West 2013)).
85. Sean Murphy, Panel OKs Parental Notification Abortion Bills,
10TV.COM
(Feb.
12,
2013),
http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/apexchange/2013/02/12/ok--abortionparental-notification.html.
86. The new regulations were promulgated under S.B. 36, 2011 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011), which required the Kansas Department of Health and
Environment to adopt rules similar to those mentioned above. See Hodes &
Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Moser, No. 2:11-CV-02365-CM-KMH, 2012 WL
1831549, at *1 (D. Kan. May 18, 2012); see also Complaint ¶¶ 1-3, 28-53,
Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Moser, (No. 11-2365) (D. Kan. argued July 1,
2011), 2011 WL 2582856; Joyce, supra note 19, at 1466. For the temperature
regulations, see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-34-134 (2014).
87. See Complaint, supra note 86, ¶ 46.
88. See id. ¶¶ 1-3, 28-75; see also John Hanna, Kansas’ Abortion Clinic
Law
Maps
Out
Details,
WICHITA
EAGLE
(June
28,
2011),
http://www.kansas.com/2011/06/28/1911589/abortion-clinic-law-maps-outdetails.html.
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regulations that will be imposed on new hospitals.89 Most
Virginia clinics will have to undergo extensive, costly
renovation to come into compliance—or, as is more likely, the
clinics will close for lack of funds to support such remodeling.90
In Texas, a 2003 regulation required that abortions at
sixteen weeks or later be performed in hospitals and surgery
centers—well before the Wade-envisioned viability benchmark
of twenty-four weeks.91 Few hospitals in Texas offered abortion
services when the law took effect, and no abortion clinics
within the state qualified as surgery centers.92 Women past
sixteen weeks pregnant were thus severely restricted in their
options and forced to travel, presumably at additional expense,
to seek abortions. Furthermore, there is currently a TRAP-style
bill advancing through the Texas legislature that will likely
result in the closure of thirty-seven of the state’s forty-two
clinics, largely because of new requirements imposed solely on
abortion providers mandating door sizes and room dimensions,
anesthetic pipelines, and other questionable ‘safety’
stipulations.93
In North Dakota, Governor Jack Dalrymple recently
“signed extreme laws . . . centering on a brazenly
unconstitutional ban on nearly all abortions once a fetal
heartbeat is ‘detectable[]’ . . . as early as six weeks into
pregnancy . . . .”94 Women may not even be aware that they are
pregnant at that point.95 The New York Times Editorial Board

89. Olympia Meola, Va. Health Commissioner Resigns, Citing Abortion
Clinic
Rules,
RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH,
http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/va-health-commissioner-resigns-citingabortion-clinic-rules/article_099db45c-4a2e-5b4b-82e2-56544518789d.html
(last updated Jan. 16, 2013).
90. Id.
91. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.004 (West 2003).
92. Alan Bavley, Supply-Side Economics and Abortion, KANSAS CITY
STAR (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.kansascity.com/2011/12/27/3340488/supplyside-economics-and-abortion.html.
93. Becca Aaronson, Critics of State Bill Say It Would Restrict Abortions,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/us/foes-oftexas-bill-say-it-would-restrict-legal-abortions.html?_r=0.
94. Editorial, The Campaign to Outlaw Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/opinion/the-campaign-to-outlawabortion.html.
95. Id.
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hypothesizes that the laws were signed into effect to force a
challenge to Wade to come before the currently “conservativedominated Supreme Court.”96
In Arizona, plaintiffs recently challenged a law that would
prohibit abortions after only twenty weeks of gestation; the law
was upheld at the district court level,97 but subsequently
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.98
In Michigan, Governor Rick Snyder recently passed a law
establishing a screening protocol with the stated purpose of
“making sure a pregnant person is not being coerced into a
decision.”99 It is not apparent that any woman has undergone a
coerced abortion in the state. Pro-choice lobbyists call the bill a
transparent attempt to “make a difficult decision even more
difficult” by subjecting women “to a type of interrogation.”100
The bill includes physical requirements for clinics that will
likely result in the closure of rural abortion clinics, thereby
reducing accessibility for rural women.101 Other states are
confronted with similar laws.102
These state regulations target surgical abortions; however,
many states also impose regulations on medical abortion. This
is another type of demand-side restriction. Medical abortion
typically involves the prescription of the abortion drug, RU486.103 Some states mandate when and how a doctor may
96. Id.
97. Isaacson v. Horne, 884 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962-64, 972 (D. Ariz. 2012).
98. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013).
99. James B. Kelleher, Governor Signs New Law for Abortion Clinics in
Michigan,
REUTERS
(Dec.
28,
2012,
7:39
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/29/us-usa-abortion-michiganidUSBRE8BS00N20121229.
100. Id. The bill requires women to disclose whether their abortion is
voluntary, amongst other details.
101. Id.
102. For a comprehensive overview of state-imposed abortion
regulations, see GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF
ABORTION
LAWS,
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (last updated Apr.
1, 2014); see also Map - State Regulation of Abortion, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/clinic/etc/map.html (last updated
June 6, 2006); Aberti, supra note 75.
103. RU-486, also known as mifepristone, is a Food & Drug
Administration (“FDA”)-approved chemical compound delivered in pill form.
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provide a prescription, including a requirement that the
woman seeking the drug be physically present when the doctor
prescribes it.104 Under some states’ regulations, the prescribing
doctor must also expose the woman to a sonogram and a statescripted ‘informed consent’ speech that notifies her of the
state’s preference for alternatives to abortion.105
This sampling of state laws illustrates an emerging trend:
a shift away from targeting demand-side abortion seekers106
toward regulating the supply-side—clinics and providers—in
newly restrictive ways, by limiting physicians’ ability to
provide abortions rather than women’s access to abortion

Access
to
RU-486,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
30,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/30/opinion/access-to-ru-486.html; see also
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir.
2012). It induces abortion in women up to nine weeks pregnant by interfering
with hormones critical to early pregnancy. Access to RU-486, supra note 103.
It is not to be confused with the “morning after” pill.
104. Fourteen states currently require patients and doctors to be in one
another’s physical presence in order for an RU-486 prescription to proceed:
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
and Texas. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MEDICATION
ABORTION,
available
at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MA.pdf (last updated Apr.
1, 2014).
105. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed
Consent: The Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling
Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 4 (Fall 2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.html.
106. Constitutionally valid demand-side regulations include: parental
and judicial consent requirements for minors, public funding restrictions (no
funding unless the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest), private
insurance restrictions, and ‘informed consent’ schemes in which clinicians
must describe the fetus to the pregnant woman and must perform a
sonogram so that she can hear the fetus’s heartbeat. See Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844, 881 (1992); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1990); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
465-66 (1977); see also NAT’L COMM. FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT, NCHLA
FACT
SHEETS:
HYDE
AMENDMENT,
(Apr.
22,
2008),
http://www.nchla.org/datasource/ifactsheets/4FSHydeAm22a.08.pdf;
Lori
Montgomery & Shailagh Murray, In Deal With Stupak, White House
Announces Executive Order on Abortion, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2010),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/white-house-announcesexecutiv.html?wprss=44. The Stupak-Pitts Amendment will persist even
after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act takes effect. See Murray,
supra note 106.
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services.107 These regulations have all severely limited abortion
options for women, but each has done so under the auspices of
maternal health, and each has initially targeted the supplyside of the abortion economy rather than the demand-side, thus
circumventing the ‘undue burden’ analysis proposed by Casey
and assumed in its progeny. In the longer run, the effect is the
same: in states served by few (or no) abortion clinics as a result
of these regulations, women are forced to travel out-of-state.108
This inflicts a greater cost on women seeking abortions,
thereby imposing a burden on their ability to access the
services they are supposed to be guaranteed (albeit in a
qualified manner) under Roe v. Wade109 and subsequent
decisions.110 These women, often already economically
marginalized,111 must travel further distances and spend more
money (generally not reimbursed by insurance112) to acquire
the abortion services to which they are entitled.113 The burden
that legislatures are imposing on the supply-side abortion
economy thus shifts to the demand-side. The result is tangible:
as TRAP-induced clinic closures increase, many women seem to
be foregoing abortion entirely.114 The Jackson Women’s Health
107. Joyce, supra note 19, at 1466.
108. Id. at 1468; see also Kliff, supra note 75; Aberti, supra note 75.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). But see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989)
(“[A] [s]tate’s decision . . . to use public facilities and staff to encourage
childbirth over abortion ‘places no governmental obstacle in the path of a
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.’” (quoting Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980))).
111. See, e.g., Quart, supra note 61.
112. Frequently, this is due to state-mandated limits on insurance
coverage for abortion procedures. Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer,
The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16, (2003) (“[F]our states of the 34 that do not
fund abortions under Medicaid had legislation prohibiting private insurance
from covering abortions except under an optional rider at additional cost . . .
.”). Such limits are constitutionally valid, including those contemplated by
the Hyde Amendment. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 326-27. The National Abortion
Federation may be applied to for financial assistance. See Quart, supra note
61.
113. See Joyce, supra note 19.
114. Bonnie Scott Jones & Tracy A. Weitz, Legal Barriers to SecondTrimester Abortion Provision and Public Health Consequences, 99 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 623, 623 (2009); see also Marshall H. Medoff, State Abortion
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Organization v. Currier injunction decisions represent the first
cases in which these issues have been directly addressed by
courts in underserved states.115
IV. The Mississippi TRAP & the Jackson Women’s Health
Organization Decisions
A. Background
Plaintiffs in Jackson Women’s Health Organization v.
Currier are the clinic itself and associated doctors, contesting a
proposed law (“Regulation”) that requires physicians working
in abortion clinics to maintain admitting and staff privileges at
local hospitals.116 The Regulation also requires that the
physicians be certified obstetricians or gynecologists
(“OB/GYN”).117 (Despite the World Health Organization’s
acknowledgement that non-OB/GYNs, including even those
who are not physicians, are equally capable of providing safe
abortions.)118 Only one of the doctors at the JWHO clinic had
Policies, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Provider Laws, and Abortion
Demand, 27 REV. POL’Y RES. 5, 577, 578-79 (2010). The undesirability of such
an outcome is beyond the scope of this paper.
115. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715 (S.D. Miss. 2012); JWHO II, 940
F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013).
116. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
117. Id.
118. Not only is it unnecessary for abortion providers to be OB/GYNspecialized, but there is significant literature supporting the contention that
abortions may be safely and effectively provided even by non-physicians:
For many years now, since first-trimester abortion
techniques have become so straightforward, it has been
technically feasible for health professionals other than
physicians to carry out first-trimester aspiration abortions,
to provide medication to women for medical abortion, and,
in both types of procedure, to monitor and follow-up [sic] the
process to a safe conclusion[] . . . midwives, nurse
practitioners, clinical officers, physician assistants and
others [can safely provide these abortions].
Marge Berer, Provision of Abortion by Mid-Level Providers: International
Policy, Practice and Perspectives, 87 WORLD HEALTH ORG. BULLETIN 58 (2009)
(emphasis added), available at www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/1/07050138/en/ (collecting sources); see also Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 17-34,
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admitting privileges and was certified for private OB/GYN
practice when the Regulation was proposed, and he did not
participate in the majority of the abortions performed at the
clinic.119 Plaintiffs had applied for and received a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”), effective on the date the Regulation
was to come into force.120 However, before the TRO and related
Regulation took effect, the state adapted the Regulation to
meet the terms of the initial TRO.121 Plaintiffs therefore
petitioned for a new TRO given the altered parameters of the
proposed Regulation, which still threatened the clinic’s ability
to remain open and the physicians’ abilities to provide
abortions without fear of criminal sanction.122 Subsequent to
the granted TRO, the clinic sought to comply with the proposed
Regulation and failed, leading to its petition in 2013 for a
preliminary injunction.123
At the time of the decisions regarding the TROs sought by
plaintiffs, JWHO was the only abortion clinic remaining in
Mississippi, largely as a result of a strict regulatory regime
that had eroded other clinics’ ability to stay in business over
time.124 The Regulation125 at issue within the JWHO case
would have resulted in temporary closure of the clinic while
physicians acquired hospital privileges, which meant that
women within Mississippi would, for a time at least, have to
travel out-of-state for abortions.126 The plaintiffs in the case
sought a temporary injunction against the Regulation, which
JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Miss. 2012) No. 3:12-CV-00436-DPJ-FKB,
2012 WL 3234936. There is “no difference in complication rates according to
the provider” and “services provided by experienced physician assistants [are]
comparable in safety and efficacy to those provided by physicians.” Berer,
supra note 118, at 59.
119. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
120. Id. at 716.
121. Id.
122. Id. The changes to the Regulation had an effect on the factors
balanced in granting a TRO, and ultimately, the court modified its earlier
ruling. Id. at 715.
123. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013).
124. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3 (2013) (criminal prosecution of nonphysicians performing abortions; criminal prosecution for physicians
performing abortions in the absence of compliance with other regulations).
125. See H.B. 1390, 2012 Leg., 127th Sess. (Miss. 2012) (codified at MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 41-75-1 (2013)).
126. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 719-20.
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the court granted in part: Judge Jordan’s decision, handed
down in July of 2012, permitted the Regulation itself to go into
effect, but stays the enforcement aspect.127 In 2013, Judge
Jordan enjoined the state from enforcing the law when
physicians at the clinic failed to come into compliance because,
despite applying for admitting privileges at every hospital, they
could not obtain them.128
B. The Court’s Analyses
In its 2012 temporary injunction decision (“2012 decision”
or “temporary injunction decision”), the Southern District of
Mississippi (Jordan, J.) performed a classic injunction
balancing test, requiring the plaintiffs to prove: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial
threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff; (3) that the
potential injury to the plaintiff outweighs any harm that
granting the injunction might cause the defendant; and, (4)
that the injunction would be in the public’s interest.129 The
same criteria were re-examined in the same court’s 2013
preliminary injunction decision (“2013 decision” or
“preliminary injunction decision”).130
In 2012, Plaintiffs proved irreparable injury by
highlighting their uncertainty over whether their continued
work at the clinic throughout the administrative process would
result in criminal prosecution.131 Although the State had
promised not to prosecute in the present, it had not promised to
withhold from future prosecution in the period between the
Law’s effective date and the physicians’ licensure.132 In 2013,
when it became apparent that the clinic could not comply with
the law because the physicians could not obtain the required
hospital admitting privileges,133 the Southern District of
127. Id.
128. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
129. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
130. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
131. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 717-19.
132. Id. at 718.
133. Physicians sought privileges “at every local hospital”; however,
“[t]wo hospital [sic] refused to provide applications, and all others rejected
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Mississippi enjoined the State from enforcing the law.134
In 2012, the court had declined to grant an injunction on
purely constitutional grounds.135 Instead, the court rested its
2012 decision on a finding of non-speculative harm that was
“actual and imminent.”136 (For a TRO to be granted, the
plaintiff must prove a non-speculative injury).137 In particular,
the court noted at the time that the “public interest” language
contained in the supporting administrative law (“the Code”)138
was vague and presented a possibility of capricious
interpretation that substantially “chill[ed] . . . [p]laintiffs’
willingness to continue operating the Clinic until they obtained
the necessary privileges.”139 This analysis recognized that
abortion law encompasses a contentious issue that is uniquely
vulnerable to politicians’ re-interpretation.140 The relevant
portion of the Code for revoking licensure within Mississippi
states, that “the status quo shall be preserved ‘except as the
court otherwise orders in the public interest.’”141 Contemplating
that abortion access in particular is affected by sudden shifts in
what constitutes ‘public interest,’ the court held that this
language was too vague to provide the plaintiffs with peace of
mind as they continued to practice in the JWHO clinic.142 The
TRO was therefore granted, enjoining defendants from using
the override discussed supra within the Code, and enjoining
defendants from enforcing the Regulation throughout the
administrative process.143 The TRO did not preclude the state

the doctors’ applications because they perform elective abortions.” JWHO II,
940 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
134. Id. at 417.
135. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (“Even if an act is unconstitutional,
it will not be preliminarily enjoined unless the plaintiff proves an irreparable
harm.”).
136. Id.
137. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tucker
Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989)).
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-75-23 (2013).
139. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
140. Id. (“Given the highly charged political context of this case and the
ambiguity still present . . . .”).
141. Id. (quoting § 41-75-23).
142. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
143. Id. at 720.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/9

26

2014]

FALLING INTO THE TRAP

973

from enacting the Regulation.144
In 2013, however, the Southern District of Mississippi
performed a deeper constitutional analysis. Judge Jordan used
the Casey ‘undue burden’ test in what he called an “‘as-applied
challenge’ because the law affects only this clinic and will force
its closure.”145 For reasons covered elsewhere in this Comment,
this is a test that I believe is significantly more likely to arrive
at a constitutionally-sound outcome, supportive of women’s
right to choose, than would be the ‘facial context’ approach that
the Southern District forewent in its 2013 decision.146 In the
2013 decision, the Southern District also quoted Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, stating, that
“[i]t is axiomatic that a statute may be invalid as applied to one
state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”147
Judge Jordan confronted a situation that has not been
explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court: whether forcing
women seeking abortions to travel out-of-state constitutes an
‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right to choose. The situation
provided him with an opportunity to lay groundwork
predicated on sound constitutional analysis for courts to follow
in future cases arising out of comparable facts, in state systems
that are increasingly antagonistic towards those who seek
abortion and those who perform it.148
C. Analyzing the Court’s Decisions
The Southern District of Mississippi examined the injury
to the plaintiffs in this case in a unique way because JWHO is
the only abortion clinic in the state.149 Atypically, the court
144. Id.
145. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 419-20 (S.D. Miss. 2013).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 419 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006)) (alteration in original).
148. This note was completed prior to the decision in Planned
Parenthood Se. v. Strange, which directly addresses this question and, in fact,
relies in part on JWHO I and II. ____ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 1320158,
M.D. Ala, Mar. 31, 2014.
149. Id. at 417.
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recognized that this factor would heighten the degree of injury
plaintiffs might suffer.150 In the temporary injunction decision,
Judge Jordan hinted that an ‘undue burden’ analysis of the
sort advocated under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart might be
warranted with respect to this Regulation and the context in
which it would operate.151 The clinic’s status as sole provider
within the state also affected the public utility balancing
inherent to the third and fourth criteria considered when
granting or rejecting a request for injunction. The preliminary
injunction decision made in 2013 explored ‘undue burden’
analysis in greater depth as part of the first prong considered
in injunction cases (“substantial likelihood of success on the
merits”).152
In defense, the State supported its contention that the law
was valid simply because it was rationally related to its
legitimate interest with language from Gonzales,153 which, as
noted supra, does appear to support this interpretation.154
Judge Jordan, noting that ‘undue burden’ analysis has been the
standard despite the Casey decision being a plurality opinion,
dismissed the rational basis argument as well, by quoting the
full section of text on which the State sought to rely:

150. In the 2013 decision, the court notes that such an issue has not
confronted courts since the “‘undue burden”’ analysis was promulgated in
Casey. Id. at 420-22. The court notes that the closest case is Mazurek v.
Armstrong, a decision in which the Supreme Court determined that since “the
disputed law would not require women to travel to a different facility than
was previously available,” there was no “‘undue burden”’ on a woman’s right
to choose. Id. at 421 (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717-18. Casey and Gonzales appear
to extend the Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation investigations of facially
neutral laws that are unconstitutionally racially discriminatory to the realm
of abortion law. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), and
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), with Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For additional discussion see, infra
Part V.B.
152. JWHO II, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 421-23.
153. Id. at 418-19.
154. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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Where it has rational basis to act, and it does not
impose an undue burden, the State may use its
regulatory power to bar certain procedures and
substitute others, all in furtherance of its
legitimate interests in regulating the medical
profession in order to promote respect for life,
including the life of the unborn.155
As Judge Jordan notes, this means that there is a two-part
test required when analyzing the constitutionality of any
abortion-related law: (1) the law must be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest (a low threshold to pass); and (2) the
law cannot impose an undue burden on women’s right to
choose.156 If the law is not rationally related, then the law is
unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent. If
the law imposes an undue burden pre-viability, the law is also
unconstitutional.
Some might argue that Judge Jordan conflated the
plaintiffs in the case—the clinic itself, and associated doctors—
with women seeking abortions. Such an argument overlooks
the fourth factor that must be considered in granting
injunctions: the public interest factor. Here, the public interest
factor is so significant—and, moreover, is constitutionally
based—that women seeking abortions may in fact be
considered ‘silent’ plaintiffs. In this context, the ‘undue burden’
analysis becomes a vital part of the decision, particularly
because there are no other in-state clinics to accommodate
displaced patients.
Unfortunately, limiting the TRO to the enforcement aspect
of the proposed Regulation while still permitting it to come into
effect did not address the ultimate issue highlighted by this
case: the targeted but piece-meal regulation of abortion
providers that is sweeping states’ legislatures. Nor did the
preliminary injunction decision of 2013 broach this issue,
although it did come closer. Admittedly, anything further
addressing TRAP laws would be beyond the scope of an
injunction decision. Nonetheless, Judge Jordan does come
155. Id. at 419 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158).
156. Id. at 420.
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tantalizingly close to addressing this concern in his brief foray
into ‘undue burden’ analysis.157 It is possible that this section of
the decision will pave the way for future decisions centering on
potential TRAP laws, particularly if judges recognize, as Judge
Jordan did here, that the constitutionality of these laws must
be examined within the context of a given state’s entire
abortion regime rather than as a stand-alone regulation. If
thus applied, the Casey/Gonzales ‘purpose and effect’ analysis
that Judge Jordan glossed over may provide a means to
counter this emerging threat to women’s reproductive rights.
V. Springing the TRAP: Solutions from Constitutional and
other areas of law
A. Solutions from Abortion Law: The Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances (“FACE”) Act—a Commerce Clause-based
solution to TRAP?
Targeting the supply side of the abortion economy is not a
new strategy in the abortion protest movement. Pro-life
advocates have been doing it for years, using threats and
outright violence to draw attention to their cause.158 The
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE”) 159 is a
federal statute designed to ensure that protestors do not hinder
women’s access to reproductive health services.160 Enacted in
157. Recognizing that a full “‘undue burden”’ analysis was beyond the
scope of his decision, Judge Jordan began a brief survey of the case law
nonetheless, with this disclaimer: “Without delving too deeply into the
analysis at this point.” JWHO I, 878 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
This not only accepts the parameters of the TRO analysis to which he was
limited, but also indicated his anticipation that this case would make its way
back to the court.
158. See NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics: Incidents of Violence &
Disruption Against Abortion Providers in the U.S. & Canada, NAT’L ABORTION
FED’N,
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/documents/Stats_Table201
1.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter NAF Violence and Disruption
Statistics].
159. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. §
248 (2012).
160. Abortion Facts: Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (“FACE”) Act,
NAT’L
ABORTION
FED’N,
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direct response to increasingly threatening pro-life protest
tactics,161 FACE restrains demonstrators from protesting
within a certain distance of any clinic providing abortion
services.162
FACE is based in the Commerce Clause, which grants
Congress authority to regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, “even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities.”163 Thus,
“FACE, [which] directly regulates a commercial activity—the
provision of reproductive health care services”164 is a
constitutionally sound exercise of Congress’s regulatory
power.165 Under this logic, state-imposed rules and regulations
targeting abortion clinics might be considered constitutionally
infirm because they similarly discriminate against interstate
commerce.166
Unfortunately, given the political tension inherent to the
abortion debate, it is unlikely that Congress will exercise its
commerce power in this area in a meaningful way. Targeting
TRAPs would require a broad-reaching and versatile law that
Congress is unlikely to be willing to pass. It seems far more
likely that the abortion regime will develop over time through
judicial decision-making.

http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/face_act.html (last visited Apr.
4, 2014) [hereinafter Abortion Facts].
161. Including but not limited to murder, attempted murder, assault,
kidnapping, arson, bombing, and anthrax threats of or to doctors who provide
abortions. See NAF Violence and Disruption Statistics, supra note 158.
162. Rebecca A. Hart & Dana Sussman, About FACE: Using Legal Tools
to Protect Abortion Providers, Clinics and Their Patients, AM. CONSTIT. SOC’Y
BLOG (July 1, 2009), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/13687; see also
Abortion Facts, supra note 160.
163. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citations omitted);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Se. Pa. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp 290,
295 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
165. Id.; see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 683-84 (7th Cir. 1995);
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995).
166. See, e.g. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). But cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
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B. Solutions from Constitutional Law: Discriminatory intent
and ‘purpose and effect’ analysis
Within current abortion jurisprudence, both the Casey and
Gonzales decisions appear to extend the Washington v. Davis
and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation investigations of facially neutral laws
that are unconstitutionally racially discriminatory to the realm
of abortion law.167
Casey and Gonzales both posit that an undue burden might
exist where a regulation’s purpose and effect is to impede a
woman’s right to choose.168 Similarly, Davis and Village of
Arlington Heights posit that a facially neutral law might be
discriminatory if it can be proved that its purpose or effect is to
institutionalize racial discrimination.169 The possibility of
racially-inspired discriminatory intent warrants strict scrutiny.
In situations where considerations of gender may have led to
the passage of discriminatory law, the Court employs what
appears to be an intermediate level of scrutiny.170
Yet no courts seem to have examined individual,
innocuous-seeming TRAP regulations that in aggregate create
a deliberately burdensome regime within either of these
frameworks of purpose and effect. Indeed, the Court—as
mentioned above—expressly stated that abortion regulation
triggers rational basis review. However, discriminatory intent
is apparent in abortion law: with regard to the Mississippi
state-legislated requirement that physicians have admitting
privileges at local hospitals, Republican Governor Phil Bryant
has stated that “[his] goal of course is to shut [the clinic]
down.”171 It seems likely that he will realize his ambition: all
167. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), and Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), with Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146.
169. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
170. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
171. Tara Culp-Ressler, Mississippi’s Last Abortion Clinic Sends a
Message: ‘We’re Here, And We’re Not Going Anywhere,’ THINKPROGRESS (Jan.
31,
2013,
11:36
AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/01/31/1519841/mississippi-last-abortion-
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seven local hospitals have so far denied licensure to the doctors
practicing abortions out of JWHO.172 It is difficult to imagine a
more evident ‘discriminatory’ purpose or effect behind the
enactment of burdensome legislation.
In order to be truly effective in combatting TRAP
regulations, ‘undue burden’ analysis will have to look beyond
the mere ‘purpose and effect’ of a single regulation being
brought before the court to explore the regulation’s purpose
and effect in context. This will require a reframing of the
abortion regulation discussion, toward a more holistic approach
that may impose greater burdens on reviewing courts, as they
will need to explore an entire regime rather than individual
regulations in assessing those regulations’ constitutionality.
This solution may not, therefore, be the most judicially
efficient—but it may be the only one possible.
This solution is reminiscent of certain solutions within the
environmental law arena. Environmental law is one of the
most ‘holistic’ areas of law today. Perhaps because of
ecosystems’
complexity
and
the
largely-unmapped
interrelationships between species, environmental law has
been forced to explore consequences of human activity on a
large scale.173 This has required courts to expand their
examinations of single actions to examine the broader context
in which they are occurring.174
This expanded contemplation of the ramifications of single
regulations or activities is most apparent within the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).175 NEPA requires
federal agencies seeking to undertake projects that will impact
the environment to submit their plans for an environmental
clinic-message/.
172. Id. In rural areas and small towns, doctors’ and hospitals’
unwillingness to offer abortion due to its controversial nature limits access,
and thereby potentially increases the stigma associated with deliberately
terminating a pregnancy. See Amy Norton, Few U.S. Ob-Gyns Provide
Abortions:
Study,
REUTERS
(Sept.
1,
2011,
1:12
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/01/us-abortionsidUSTRE7804JN20110901.
173. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(2004).
174. Id.
175. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214370h (2012).
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impact assessment (“EIS”).176 As the program developed,
however, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), which
was charged with enforcing the statute,177 found that
developers were breaking up large projects that would have
devastating environmental effects into smaller pieces.178 The
smaller pieces could pass through the EPA review process
easily because their individual effects were minute.
The Tenth Circuit’s solution to this problem, announced in
Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management,179
was to require that each piece of the project being examined by
EPA in the EIS process pass an ‘independent utility test.’180
The Tenth Circuit also acknowledged that NEPA requires that
“connected actions” be considered when assessing the
environmental impact of any given project.181 Actions are
considered “connected” for NEPA purposes if: (1) they trigger
other actions that will require EIS’s; (2) they “cannot or will not
proceed unless other actions are taken previously or
simultaneously”; or (3) they “are interdependent parts of a
larger action and depend on the larger action for their
justification.”182 Similarly, certain abortion regulations might
be deemed discriminatory in purpose and effect when examined
contextually, as federal activities must be under NEPA. This is,
therefore, a solution that might be worth importing into the
abortion ‘undue burden’ discourse.

176. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir.
2007).
177. Basic
Information,
ENVTL
PROT
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
178. See, e.g., Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 531
F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The purpose of this requirement
[determining whether an action is a connected action] is to prevent an agency
from dividing a project into multiple actions, each of which individually has
an insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a
substantial impact.” (quoting Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d
955,969 (9th Cir. 2006))).
179. Id. at 1220.
180. See id. at 1228-29.
181. Id. at 1128 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2013)).
182. § 1508.25(a)(1).
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VI. Conclusion
Current ‘undue burden’ analysis is inadequate not only for
the subjectivity inherent to an examination of ‘purpose and
effect’ but also for its failure to take into account the overall
effect of a single law within the pre-existing abortion law
framework within each state. Its focus on the demand side of
the abortion economy renders it a weak tool in combatting
TRAPs, and its utility is further eroded by the development of
new technology that is changing our ability to track
pregnancies and our ability to enable a fetus to survive outside
the womb. The inadequacy of ‘undue burden’ analysis is a
threat to women’s right to reproductive autonomy—a threat
that current constitutional law is not equipped to counter.
Given the political divisiveness of the abortion issue,
Congress or the Supreme Court should consider adopting an
analytical procedural technique (as opposed to a substantive
pro-choice bill) that takes into consideration the effect of
individually constitutional laws that may be designed to
cumulatively suppress a woman’s right to choose. This
technique might be adapted from other areas of constitutional
law, such as the ‘purpose and effect’ inquiry prompted by
potentially discriminatory race-related legislation, or imported
from the broader contextual/overall effect inquiry required by
NEPA.
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